When workplace unionism in global value chains does not function well : exploring the impediments by Louche, Céline et al.
Vol.:(0123456789) 
Journal of Business Ethics 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-018-3980-5
ORIGINAL PAPER
When Workplace Unionism in Global Value Chains Does Not Function 
Well: Exploring the Impediments
Céline Louche1 · Lotte Staelens2 · Marijke D’Haese2
Received: 30 August 2017 / Accepted: 13 July 2018 
© Springer Nature B.V. 2018
Abstract
Improving working conditions at the bottom of global value chains has become a central issue in our global economy. In 
this battle, trade unionism has been presented as a way for workers to make their voices heard. Therefore, it is strongly 
promoted by most social standards. However, establishing a well-functioning trade union is not as obvious as it may seem. 
Using a comparative case study approach, we examine impediments to farm-level unionism in the cut flower industry in 
Ethiopia. For this purpose, we propose an integrated framework combining two lenses, namely a vertical one (governance 
and structure of global value chains) and a horizontal one (socio-economic context). We identify 10 impediments that point 
to three major dimensions contributing to unionisation. These three dimensions include awareness of and interest from 
workers, legitimacy of trade unions, and capacity of trade unions to act. Furthermore, our results suggest that private social 
standards may, in certain cases, be counterproductive for the efficient functioning of trade unions. Although we argue that 
there is no ‘quick fix’ solution to weak workplace unionism at the bottom of global value chains, we stress the importance 
of considering the dynamics of, and interactions between, the impediments when designing potential support measures that 
mitigate negative impacts.
Keywords Global value chains · Workplace unionism · Working conditions · Private social standards · Cut flower industry · 
Ethiopia
Introduction
Freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining 
are considered intrinsic principles of social justice (Anner 
2012; Barrientos and Smith 2007; Elliott and Freeman 
2003). They aim to provide workers with a voice, most of 
the time through trade unionism, to formulate their griev-
ances and enable them to negotiate specified conditions of 
employment in a collective bargaining agreement, such as 
minimum wages, working hours, and health and safety issues 
(Barrientos and Smith 2007; Egels-Zandén and Merk 2014; 
Frenkel 2001; Riisgaard 2011). These are fundamental rights 
protecting workers and providing them with means to engage 
with their employers (Elliott and Freeman 2003; Van Buren 
and Greenwood 2008). Hence, when it comes to making sus-
tained improvements on the shop floor, workers’ voices and 
representation are considered vital (Egels-Zandén and Merk 
2014; Greenwood 2002, Ip 2008). Although those rights are 
widely recognised, a key question remains: how to move 
from principles of freedom of association and collective bar-
gaining (cf. ILO conventions 87 and 98) to implementation?
This question is even more salient at the bottom of a 
global value chain (GVC). Since the 1980s, globalisation 
and trade liberalisation have led to the relocation of labour-
intensive production to low-wage countries where produc-
tion workers within GVCs are seldom organised, and where 
experience with trade unionism is very limited (Carswell 
and De Neve 2013; Egels-Zandén and Merk 2014; Lund-
Thomsen 2013). Over the last decade, the issue of workers’ 
representation and collective bargaining in developing and 
export-oriented countries has attracted growing attention 
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from scholars (Egels-Zandén and Hyllman 2007; Egels-
Zandén and Merk 2014; Riisgaard 2009). Unionisation in 
the global South remains challenging for unions in terms of 
its formation and effectivity (De Neve 2008).
Literature surrounding the GVC has approached the 
issue of worker’s representation and freedom of association 
with a vertical lens, investigating governance and structure 
of GVCs. It has significantly contributed to a better under-
standing of the implementation of private social standards 
(PSS) and their impact on working conditions (Barrientos 
and Smith 2007; Egels-Zandén and Merk 2014; Riisgaard 
2009; Wang 2005). However, understanding the contribution 
of PSS to overcome impediments to workplace unionisation 
is arguably not straightforward (Braun and Gearhart 2004; 
Compa 2004).
GVC literature has been criticised for its overly verti-
cal focus, emphasising the linear structures and underplay-
ing the institutional and local dimensions (Coe et al. 2008; 
Neilson and Pritchard 2009; Tallontire et al. 2011). Some 
scholars, using a horizontal lens, have paid more attention 
to the socio-economic context to explore how labour can or 
cannot change their terms and conditions of employment 
(Neilson and Pritchard 2009; Tallontire et al. 2011). In par-
ticular, the Global Production Network literature, by focus-
ing on the social, cultural, and political relations between 
actors (beyond suppliers) and institutions, has significantly 
contributed to this stream of study (Carswell and De Neve 
2013; Coe et al. 2008; Henderson et al. 2002; Lund-Thomsen 
2013).
If both the horizontal and vertical perspectives provide 
key insights into understanding the challenges that trade 
unionism faces in developing countries, they each focus 
on distinctive sides of the story. This calls for a need to 
connect and empirically study the interaction between the 
two approaches (Neilson and Pritchard 2009; Tallontire 
et al. 2011). Studies have begun to integrate the vertical and 
horizontal dimensions focusing especially on governance 
or labour agency (Carswell and De Neve 2013; Gereffi and 
Lee 2016; Lund-Thomsen 2013; Riisgaard and Okinda 2018; 
Tallontire 2007; Tallontire et al. 2011). Yet, to our knowl-
edge, none have used an integrated analytical framework 
to study workplace unionism in GVCs. This paper contrib-
utes to this call by proposing a framework that integrates 
both vertical and horizontal perspectives to deepen our 
understanding of the impediments for the well-functioning 
of workplace unionism at the bottom of agricultural value 
chains.
For this purpose, we conducted an in-depth analysis of 
two farms in the cut flower industry in Ethiopia (one with 
a PSS and one without) which enabled us to identify ten 
impediments to workplace unionism. Our results show 
counter-intuitive outcomes, namely if both farms faced 
impediments, only the non-certified farm met the necessary 
conditions to move from individual grievance to collective 
action.
This study highlights the importance of considering both 
the vertical and horizontal theoretical lenses to understand 
workplace unionism in GVCs. Our integrated analytical 
framework offers a way to expand the vertical GVC approach 
in two ways. Firstly, it shows that the well-functioning of 
trade unions at farm level cannot be reduced to a one-dimen-
sional factor. It results from complex and sometimes con-
flicting dynamics of several forces. Secondly, it contributes 
in recognising the dimensions that can either reinforce or 
downplay the impediments. Hence, we argue that an inte-
grated approach is needed to understand why workplace 
unionism in GVCs tends to remain on the fringes. These 
insights are imperative for those who wish to make collec-
tive organisation of workers possible.
The article is structured as follows. First, we review the 
vertical (GVC) and horizontal (local socio-economic con-
text) forces. Second, we introduce the empirical context and 
methodology. Third, we present our results following our 
integrated framework. Fourth, we discuss our findings and 
ways to tackle the impediments. Finally, limitations and fur-
ther research opportunities are presented.
Towards an Integrated Framework
A growing body of literature on labour agency in GVCs 
recognises that actors in production and the rest of the chain 
do not operate in isolation of others and of inter-firm and 
non-firm networks (Alford et al. 2017; Hess 2004). In their 
study on coffee and tea plantations in South India, Neilson 
and Pritchard (2009) challenge what they refer to as the ‘uni-
directional’ focus on global, buyer-driven regulations of the 
value chain in the GVC literature by adding an understand-
ing of the struggles of place-bound actors. As Gereffi and 
Fernandez-Stark (2011) argue, this is because all ‘vertical’ 
GVCs ‘touch down’ in landscapes formed by workers, firms, 
and suppliers; their local realities; and institutional environ-
ments which are themselves embedded in social, economic, 
and institutional contexts (Coe et al. 2008; Gereffi and Fer-
nandez-Stark 2011).
In response to these limitations of the GVC vertical 
approach, some authors have used a Global Production Net-
work (GPN) framework to analyse labour agency (Cum-
bers et al. 2008), even in developing contexts (Alford et al. 
2017; Baglioniy 2018; Riisgaard and Okinda 2018). The 
GPN literature has a keen interest to study the dynamics 
of territorially and social embeddedness (Hess 2004). It 
criticises the ‘verticality’ of the GVC analytical framework, 
and argues that “GPN configurations and characteristics are 
shaped by and, in turn, shape the geographically differenti-
ated social, political and cultural circumstances in which 
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they exist” (Coe et al. 2008, p. 274). However, the embed-
dedness, which is considered not linear nor static, is not 
easily understood when it comes to workers employed in 
production networks/value chains in the South (Alford et al. 
2017). Moreover, evidence is particularly scant on the (well) 
functioning of workplace unionism in global value chains at 
the farm level, a void this paper addresses.
Drawing from an extensive literature review, we have 
identified four vertical forces, namely demand fluctuations, 
just-in-time orders, downward pressures on prices, and pri-
vate social standards. We have also identified five horizontal 
forces which include livelihood strategies, spatial location 
of workers, gendered economies, regulatory framework, and 
union tradition. Altogether, those forces draw the contours of 
our integrated framework. Although those forces are specifi-
cally relevant to agricultural value chains within a develop-
ing country context, they are not exclusive to this sector and 
production area.
Vertical Lens
A vertical GVC approach explores how global industries are 
organised and structured (Gereffi 1994). Kritzinger, Barrien-
tos, and Rossouw (2004) wrote that GVCs are about linking 
local producers from developing countries to international 
markets. This approach helps to identify the different actors 
involved in a given industry, as well as the role and power 
they have in controlling the production (Kritzinger et al. 
2004). Moreover, the GVC lens has been widely adopted 
to study the impact of a value chain’s structure on working 
conditions at the point of production (Barrientos et al. 2003; 
Nadvi 2008; Riisgaard and Hammer 2011).
Applying a vertical lens to agricultural value chains 
helps us to understand that producers face several, some-
times contradictory, forces when they enter competitive 
global markets. These forces have important implications 
for working conditions and labour strategies (Kritzinger 
et al. 2004). Most agricultural value chains are buyer-driven, 
which means that the power lies with the buyers, in other 
words, large retailers, branded marketers, international pro-
cessors, and international traders (Riisgaard and Hammer 
2011). They dictate the terms and conditions under which 
the chains operate, despite the fact that they do not have any 
production capabilities (Gereffi and Fernandez-Stark 2011). 
Retailers determine the specifications of supply and the 
high technical, environmental, and social standards which 
producers need to meet. They allow the market to set the 
prices and offer little guarantees of purchase (Barrientos and 
Kritzinger 2004), which in turn affects the conditions against 
which workers are hired.
From the literature review, we identified four forces that 
may affect unionism within the agricultural value chain 
arising from vertical integration. Firstly, the seasonal 
demand for the produce and demand fluctuations may 
potentially affect workplace unionism. Industries such 
as fruit, vegetables, and flowers are all characterised by 
high levels of insecure and seasonal employment (Bar-
rientos 2008; Tallontire et al. 2005). As a result, work-
ers employed on an insecure basis may not be interested 
in collective action because they only have a short-term 
vision of their work. Many of them may also be scared to 
join a union because they may be on short-term contracts 
that can easily be terminated by management (Egels-Zan-
dén and Merk 2014; Tjandraningsih and Nugroho 2008). 
At the same time, a highly fluctuating workforce makes 
it extremely difficult to keep up with union recruitment, 
organisation, and activity (Wills 2005).
As a second force, buyers try to overcome demand insta-
bility by seeking greater organisational flexibility and to 
place just-in-time orders (Kritzinger et al. 2004). By doing 
so, they pass on costs of risk and uncertainty to produc-
ers. To be able to meet the ever-changing requirements, 
producers need a flexible workforce that is willing to work 
long hours and do overtime to provide high-quality prod-
ucts within specified delivery times (Riisgaard 2009). This 
means that workers, who in horticulture are predominantly 
women, face a ‘double burden’ (Kidder and Raworth 2004) 
where it is quite challenging to combine reproductive work 
with productive work that requires working weeks of 48 h 
and excessive overtime. Hence, workers often have too lit-
tle spare time to take part in organising campaigns (Wills 
2005).
Thirdly, workplace unionisation may be affected by the 
downward pressures on prices that producers face due to 
high levels of competition and price volatility (Barrientos 
and Kritzinger 2004). This is at the expense of workers who 
are paid extremely low wages for their work. These low-
wage levels may hamper workplace unionism in direct and 
indirect ways. Smith et al. (2004) found that workers were 
reluctant to pay membership fees because they preferred to 
use their money for current concerns rather than invest it in 
uncertain long-term changes. In response to this, unions low-
ered membership fees, which resulted in limited resources, 
thus obstructing the unions’ recruitment, training, and col-
lective actions. As was argued by Smith et al. (2004), this 
created a vicious circle, whereby the workers most in need of 
union representation, namely low-paid and insecure workers, 
were the least likely to be recruited.
Fourth, in order to meet consumer concerns, some large 
supermarkets demand from agricultural producers that they 
adhere to strict private social standards (PSS), which labour 
can exploit to their advantage (Riisgaard 2011). These stand-
ards require farms to promote and respect core ILO con-
ventions, including the right to collective bargaining and 
freedom of association (87, 98 and 135, respectively) (Bar-
rientos and Smith 2007). Hence, labour could use the PSS 
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of the firm as leverage and be more effectively organised 
on certified farms than on farms that do not adhere to PSS.
Many studies confirm that PSS have played a crucial role 
in improving working conditions and encouraging workers’ 
trade union (Barrientos and Smith 2007; Niklas; Egels-Zan-
dén and Merk 2014; Riisgaard 2009; Wang 2005). Moreover, 
trade unions may be a critical partner in creating a conducive 
firm/farm environment to the success of PSS in improving 
working conditions, or failure in case of limited support 
(Riisgaard 2011). Although trade unions and organisations 
issuing the PSS strive for the same goal, namely better con-
ditions for the workers, their relationship is complex and 
may involve tensions (Braun and Gearhart 2004; Compa 
2004). Past research argued that current monitoring mecha-
nisms of the PSS are unable to detect violations of trade 
union rights (Anner 2012; Brown 2013; Vegt 2005; Wang 
2005). Research that pointed at these limitations in the moni-
toring systems suggests that PSS may even undermine trade 
union rights by allowing parallel means of workers organi-
sations, and by lacking effective grievance mechanisms 
(Brown and O’rourke 2007; Egels-Zandén and Merk 2014; 
Yu 2009). Tensions may arise when unions are perceived or 
presented by the firm as a ‘proof of compliance’ to the social 
codes rather than being recognised as representation of the 
workforce (Staelens 2016); or if unions conceive the way 
forward to improve working conditions differently as to what 
is prescribed in the PSS (Braun and Gearhart 2004; Compa 
2004). Moreover, actors in the value chain, including buyers 
and suppliers, may have limited incentives to actually pro-
mote and respect trade union rights (Barrientos and Smith 
2007; Jiang et al. 2009; Sum and Ngai 2005). In addition, as 
shown in this research, unions and worker collectives may 
succeed in protecting workers’ rights even without PSS, with 
or without external support, for example, women workers’ 
committees in the flower sector (Jacobs et al. 2015). These 
previous studies suggest that PSS criteria, in principle, may 
provide workers with some room to organise themselves col-
lectively, yet in practice, this is not necessarily guaranteed.
Horizontal Lens
The ‘horizontal’ approach accounts for the local socio-
economic—embedded—context in which labour-intensive 
industries operate (Carswell and De Neve 2013; Coe et al. 
2008; Tampe 2018). It explores the role of local factors in 
facilitating or constraining workers’ ability to improve their 
overall working lives and livelihoods (Lund-Thomsen 2013), 
which aligns with the local and institutional axes provided 
by the GPN literature. Although we do recognise that organ-
ised and collective forms of resistance represent only one 
of the possible options to act by labour (Wills and Simms 
2004), we believe that collective forms of labour agency are 
the most promising when it comes to improving working 
lives (Coe and Jordhus-Lier 2011). Within literature, we 
identify five horizontal forces that may facilitate or hinder 
workplace unionism at the bottom of agricultural value 
chains in developing countries.
The first force, livelihood strategies, refers to the portfolio 
of activities and social support systems on which house-
holds can build their livelihoods (Ellis 1998). The number 
and combination of strategies that workers have at their 
disposal can facilitate or constrain workplace unionism. In 
many developing country settings, individuals engage in 
multiple income-generating activities. For instance, agricul-
tural activities are combined with petty trade and/or formal 
wage work so as to cope with potential income shocks and 
to improve one’s standard of living (Barrett et al. 2001; Ellis 
1998). Workers who have several livelihood options may 
find it easier to opt in and out of wage work. Furthermore, 
workers whose income are entirely dependent on one income 
source and who have few alternatives to turn to may find it 
much more difficult to leave a formal job. Industries that 
employ workers of whom the vast majority can decide to 
opt in and out of work (because of their alterative livelihood 
options) are much more difficult to organise than industries 
with a stable workforce of workers whose sole income is 
dependent on this wage work (Wills 2005). Whether indi-
viduals have the opportunity or not to engage in several 
income-generating activities is dependent on local factors 
such as location, access to assets (for example, land), barri-
ers to entry, and seasonality (Ellis 1998).
Secondly, the spatial location of workers in terms of the 
distance between a worker’s home and workplace, and also 
between co-workers, may facilitate or hinder workplace 
unionism (Lund-Thomsen 2013). Labour markets for low-
paid jobs often attract a broad range of workers, includ-
ing workers living in urban settings, workers residing in 
rural areas surrounding the factories, and migrant workers 
who left the countryside to take chances in new factories 
(Carswell and De Neve 2013). This segmented nature of 
the labour market could raise problems with regard to com-
munication and a differentiated identity, which makes it 
particularly challenging for unions to organise workers col-
lectively (Wills 2005). Moreover, the distance to and from 
the workplace, when combined with a lack of mobility, may 
hamper the possibility to participate in union activities such 
as attending union meetings held outside the workplace or 
helping to organise campaigns.
A third factor may facilitate or hinder workers wish-
ing to collectively organise themselves on the shop floor, 
namely gendered economies. The notion of gender is used to 
describe how male and female roles are socially constructed 
(Annandale and Clark 1996). Gender studies aim to under-
stand how these constructed gender roles influence both 
the productive and reproductive economy (Barrientos et al. 
2003). With regard to the productive economy, it appears 
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that men in developing countries have access to better paid 
and more stable jobs compared to women, who often need 
to engage in more temporary, low-paid, and informal jobs 
(Barrientos et al. 2003; Lund-Thomsen 2013). This gender 
division becomes even clearer in the reproductive economy, 
where women are often solely responsible for unpaid domes-
tic work and child care-related activities (Barrientos et al. 
2003).
At the bottom of agricultural value chains, and in particu-
lar in horticulture, the majority of the workforce are women 
who are hired in for low-skilled, routine jobs such as pick-
ing and packing, and processing activities because they are 
perceived as more productive and responsible, and more 
skilled at performing delicate tasks (Kidder and Raworth 
2004). Men on the other hand are hired for hazardous work 
or supervisory jobs, which have a more permanent nature 
and are better paid (Barrientos et al. 2003; Korovkin and 
Sanmiguel-Valderrama 2007). Existing gender roles also 
affect union participation and, more generally, workplace 
unionism. Historically, trade unions have been organising 
working men, while women appeared to be left out of these 
organisations (Wills 2005). As previously mentioned, time 
is often an issue where women face a double work burden, 
in the sense that they combine both productive and repro-
ductive activities, and therefore often have little spare time 
to take part in organising campaigns (Kidder and Raworth 
2004; Wills 2005). Hence, in sectors dominated by female 
workers, which is the case for most low-technology, labour-
intensive industries where we see a ‘feminisation’ of the 
workforce (Barrientos et al. 2003), it may be particularly 
difficult for unions to enter the workplace.
As a fourth horizontal force, the regulatory framework 
within the country may facilitate or hinder the development 
and functioning of a workers’ organisation. In countries 
where policies legally constrain union activities, workers’ 
voices are effectively smothered (Egels-Zandén and Merk 
2014). Government may indirectly affect workers’ ability to 
act collectively, for example, through favourable investment 
laws and incentives. The absence of a minimum wage or 
ill-designed labour laws (for example, making strike action 
illegal, or not protecting union representatives on the shop 
floor from being fired easily) may also hamper workers’ col-
lective strategies.
A final factor affecting workplace unionism is the union 
tradition in the host country. The question whether work-
ers can defend their interests in export industries is to a 
large extent dependent on the network they can draw upon. 
Within an organisation, shop stewards play a crucial role 
in recruiting, organising, and mobilising the workforce. 
However, without any support from the outside, success 
remains limited (Blyton and Jenkins 2013). In settings with 
little tradition of trade unionism, it may be extremely hard to 
negotiate better working conditions. In many export-oriented 
countries, unions are often highly fragmented, lack funding, 
and are sometimes even corrupt (Egels-Zandén and Merk 
2014). In contrast, where unions have strong historical roots, 
there is scope for collective organisation. Workers employed 
in factories that are clustered even enjoy an extra advantage: 
local clusters offer a particularly high potential for local joint 
action since union representatives from different farms can 
collaborate, exchanging information and threatening widely 
supported boycotts and community-based actions (Lund-
Thomsen and Nadvi 2010; Riisgaard and Hammer 2011; 
Wills 2005).
The four vertical forces and five horizontal forces we 
have presented in this section draw the contours of our inte-
grated framework. We argue that both sets of forces generate 
impediments to collective labour organisation at the bottom 
of global value chains.
Methodology
Context: The Cut Flower Industry in Ethiopia
One of the characteristics of the cut flower industry is the 
existence of two value chain strands for flowers, namely the 
auction and the direct strand. Moreover, the industry com-
prises both adopters and non-adopters of PSS, which allows 
a close comparison between different value chain govern-
ance structures. The auction strand is the most popular 
mechanism through which flowers from East Africa are sold 
(Riisgaard and Hammer 2011). Auctions are basically distri-
bution centres where large quantities of flowers are sold to 
buyers all over the world. These market-based transactions 
provide little transparency and are characterised by a weak 
tie between buyers and suppliers. PSS are not a requirement 
to sell flowers through the auction (Hale and Opondo 2005; 
Riisgaard and Hammer 2011). The direct strand mainly 
involves European retailers who directly source from flower 
farms, hereby circumventing the auction (Riisgaard 2011). 
This strand is more strictly co-ordinated and buyer-driven 
than the auction strand. In response to consumer concerns, 
large retailers often require strict social standards from the 
growers. These standards facilitate coordination between 
buyer and supplier by providing information on the nature 
of the flowers and the conditions under which they have 
been grown (Henson and Humphrey 2010; Ponte and Gib-
bon 2005; Riisgaard 2011). Hence, growers who wish to 
sell directly are obliged to comply with the external cer-
tification of standards (Hale and Opondo 2005; Riisgaard 
and Hammer 2011). Dolan and Opondo (2005) as well as 
Riisgaard (2011) identified at least 20 different social and/ or 
environmental schemes in the cut flower sector. One of the 
most important and oldest is the Milieu Programma Sierteelt 
(MPS). It was created in 1995 in The Netherlands by Dutch 
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growers together with the Dutch flower auctions. It has an 
environmental label (MPS A, B, and C) with a social option 
(MPS-SQ). The latter is based on universal human rights and 
requires the enforcement of core ILO conventions, including 
promoting freedom of association and collective bargain-
ing, no discrimination, no child nor forced labour (Barri-
entos 2008). MSP-QS is very similar to the more generic 
Ethical Trading Initiative (ETI) label that originates from 
an alliance of United Kingdom (UK) companies, NGOs, 
and trade unions (Barrientos and Smith 2007; Hughes et al. 
2007). As noted by Riisgaard (2011), MPS-SQ focuses on 
process rights rather than outcomes. “Appendix” provides 
an overview of the working conditions that are included in 
the MPS-SQ standards as compared to those included in 
the ILO norms, the Ethiopian labour laws, and the ETI. The 
monitoring of the MPS certification is done by certification 
bodies that employ auditors. Audits are carried out in a cycle 
of three years during which compliance to the requirements 
are being checked (MPS-SQ 2002).
Another particular characteristic of the flower industry is 
that the demand for flowers is seasonal which has a direct 
impact on labour conditions. European consumers tend 
to buy cut flowers for Valentine’s Day and Mother’s Day, 
whereas they buy fewer flowers during the summer period 
(June–August) (Hale and Opondo 2005). As a result of these 
uneven demand patterns, workers are often hired on an inse-
cure basis and are required to work very long hours during 
months of peak demand (Barrientos and Kritzinger 2004). In 
Ethiopia, workers can easily work up to 60 h a week during 
peak production periods (48 h a week topped with 12 h of 
overtime) (Staelens et al. 2016). Finally, the world market for 
cut flowers has grown consistently since the early 1980s as 
more countries started producing cut flowers. However, the 
demand has not grown at the same pace. This has resulted in 
a high level of competition and downward pressure on prices 
(Riisgaard and Hammer 2011). Consequently, this has led to 
extremely low wages dominating the industry. In Ethiopia, 
wages are around one dollar per day (Staelens et al. 2016). 
The characteristics presented here highlight the relevance of 
vertical forces, which have been identified in the previous 
section, in this industry.
In Ethiopia, the cut flower industry is a relatively young, 
but rapidly growing sector. The first flower farms started 
their operations in the early 2000s. By early 2008, it was 
estimated that 64 farms were already operational (Mano 
et al. 2011; Melese and Helmsing 2010). This success can 
be attributed to the Ethiopian government, which managed 
to create an attractive investment climate, and to the cheap 
labour supply, partially due to the absence of minimum 
wages (Mano et al. 2011). Ethiopian flower farm workers 
earn up to three times less than neighbouring Kenyan flower 
farm workers (Riisgaard and Gibbon 2014). As with most 
labour-intensive industries, the large majority of people 
employed in the cut flower industry are women who live 
either in the rural surroundings of the farms or in neighbour-
ing towns.
Trade unionism in Ethiopia is relatively young, even by 
African standards (Praeg 2006). It can be described as an 
under-developed and rather anti-union context with, accord-
ing to ITUC, ‘systematic violations of trade union rights’ 
(ITUC 2018). The constitution of Ethiopia provides for the 
right to freedom of association and collective bargaining, 
although civil servants and some other important section 
of the working class are denied this right (Egulu 2004). 
As shown in “Appendix”, the Ethiopian labour laws pro-
tect certain worker rights. Yet, at the same time, the Ethio-
pian government has put considerable efforts in attracting 
foreign investors through favourable investment laws and 
incentives (such as relax taxation, relax regulations, and 
offering affordable land rents) that have an indirect negative 
effect on workers. Labour is presented as ‘abundant’ and 
‘cheap’, creating an environment allowing to pay extremely 
low wages (Getu 2009). In 1963, an alliance of trade unions 
in Ethiopia created the Confederation of Ethiopian Trade 
Unions (CETU). CETU is organised in departments to sup-
port different sectors, including the agricultural sector. How-
ever, CETU, just like most of the trade unions operating in 
developing and transition economies, faces many challenges 
such as a lack of funding and bargaining experience, a lack 
of control from the governmental bodies, the close interfer-
ence with the government, and regular threats towards union 
activities (Egulu 2004; Praeg 2006; Rahmato 2002). CETU 
also reported on the difficulty of organising workers who are 
eligible to form unions and the denial of the rights of work-
ers to form unions by most private employers (CETU 2012). 
Although allowed by the constitution, unionism in Ethiopia 
does not go by itself.
Research Design
To identify the impediments that can help us to understand 
why workplace unions are not well-functioning at the bottom 
of the agricultural value chains, we chose an explorative and 
comparative case study approach (Eisenhardt and Graebner 
2007). Case studies are well suited to answer ‘why’ ques-
tions and allow for in-depth and context-rich analysis (Car-
son et al. 2015; Yin 2003). While it does not allow for the 
generalisability of the findings, it is ideal as it regards the 
theoretical gap that we aimed to address (Siggelkow 2007).
In terms of a theoretical sampling strategy, we chose to 
focus on two well representative farms in which unions were 
active. The farm-level unions were close to what is called 
‘enterprise union’ as they were, at least on paper, independ-
ent from management and rather independent in terms of 
organisation (Benson and Gospel 2008). However, the work-
place unions remained under the umbrella of the sectorial 
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branch of CETU, which also helped to establish the work-
place unions.
The two selected farms showed various similarities that 
were essential for comparing them. Both cases were geo-
graphically situated close to one another within a single clus-
ter of flower farms. This means that they were exposed to 
the same institutional forces (Gibson and Birkinshaw 2004). 
In addition, both farms began their operations during the 
2005–2006 period, were similar in land size and workforce 
size, and were owned by Ethiopian investors. Nevertheless, 
they had a major difference that permitted to contrast the 
two cases as only one farm had adopted a PSS, more specifi-
cally the MPS certification, as both were targeting different 
markets.
Our sampling strategy enabled us to minimise extraneous 
variability and at the same time to observe contrasts through 
the examination of polar examples (Eisenhardt 1989; Yin 
2003). Table 1 provides a detailed overview of the two cases.
In terms of unionisation, we found great differences when 
comparing these two farms, which allowed a rich investiga-
tion of the impediments to workplace unionism. As shown 
in Table 2, union density on the non-certified farm is higher 
than on the certified farm and the union was positively per-
ceived by workers while on the certified farm it suffered 
from a negative image. In both cases, the link between the 
farm union representatives and the federal union CETU was 
extremely weak or almost non-existent. CETU’s role limited 
itself to the election of the union’s representatives and ensur-
ing a gender-balance committee during the establishment 
of the farm-level unions. Although CETU was supposed to 
hold regular meetings with farm-level union’s representa-
tives, our cases revealed that CETU was challenged by the 
high turnover of the representatives, making it difficult to 
build a relationship or simply to organise meetings. At the 
time of data collection, none of the farms had yet reached 
a collective agreement (CA), although it was very close to 
completion in the non-certified farm. The CA is a necessity 
for the union to be fully recognised by CETU, but not a 
requirement to receive the MPS certification.
Data
We collected data at three different levels (worker, farm 
management, and farm cluster) and during two different time 
periods (June and July 2013). To ensure data validity (Yin 
2003), we collected data through different means, namely a 
survey, interviews, and focus group discussions.
Data collection at the worker level involved face-to-
face interviews. They were conducted by Ethiopian female 
Master’s students fluent in Amharic and Oromo, the 
mother tongues of the flower farm workers. Prior to data 
collection, we provided training to the students on how to 
conduct the interviews and lead the focus groups. Ran-
dom sampling procedures were used to ensure adequate 
representation. Interviews were held with 75 workers per 
farm performing different job functions. A total of 150 
responses were collected for the two case studies. After 
accounting for missing data, we obtained a final sample of 
143 cases (96 women and 47 men). The survey included 
both open and closed-ended questions. The first section of 
the survey focused on socio-demographics, working con-
ditions, and workers’ well-being. Then a specific section 
covered issues around trade unions: (a) workers’ awareness 
of union presence on the farm, (b) union membership, and 
Table 1  Description of the cases
Start of 
operation
Number of workers Targeted market Internationally recognised 
private social standards?
Applied 
since when?
Workplace 
unionism?
Certified farm 2005 390–455 Auction and direct deals MPS-ABC* 2009 Yes
MPS-SQ 2010
Non-certified farm 2006 260–330 Auction No Yes
Table 2  Trade unions on case 
study farms
a Figures were calculated based on survey data
Union  densitya Workers’ 
perceptions
Union origins Union leaders
< 6 months’ 
employment
≥ 6 months’ 
employment
Certified farm
 30.0% 0% 44.7% Negative Top-down Unable to mobilise and not 
trusted by workers
Non-certified farm
 34.2% 5.7% 60.5% Positive Bottom-up Willing and able to mobilise
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(c) personal motivation for (not) being a member. The last 
part of the survey was captured with open-ended ques-
tions. Based on the survey, Table 3 provides an overview 
of the workers’ characteristics.
In addition, we held three focus group discussion; one 
focus group per farm and one focus group combining work-
ers from both flower farms. Focus groups consisted of 
female workers, as they represent 90% of the workers on 
the farms. Moreover, we wanted to ensure a safe space for 
discussion. The focus groups consisted of 5–14 participants 
and had a duration of approximately 2 h. Each focus group 
discussion was held off-site, in an informal setting and took 
place on the workers’ day off. After each focus group ses-
sion, a debriefing meeting was held between the moderator 
(the Master’s student) and the researcher. The purpose of 
the focus group discussions was to gain a broader picture 
of workers’ perceptions of their working life and of their 
ability to change or influence their work environment. Each 
focus group was recorded and transcribed. The accompany-
ing researcher took extensive observation notes during the 
discussion.
We also conducted interviews with the head of the trade 
union representative of each farm (both were women). Union 
representatives had the mission of bargaining the collec-
tive agreement, collecting membership fees, being aware of 
workers’ concerns, and raising these concerns with man-
agement. These semi-structured interviews took place off 
the farm, in an informal setting. Each interview lasted for 
approximately one hour. The purpose of these interviews 
was to gain insight on the origins of the union, the chal-
lenges they faced, as well as the experiences they had with 
workers, management, and external stakeholders (e.g. audi-
tors and CETU).
At management level, we conducted in-depth interviews 
with the general managers of each farm. The interviews 
lasted between an hour and an hour and a half. Although the 
interviews did not necessarily focus on workplace unionism, 
the issue emerged during the discussion. For the purpose of 
this study, it was fruitful to uncover management percep-
tions of unionism to triangulate and corroborate the research 
results that we obtained through other data sources.
At cluster level, we conducted an in-depth interview with 
two representatives of the labour and social affairs depart-
ment of the region. This interview had a duration of one hour 
and was particularly relevant in the sense that it provided a 
clearer picture of labour issues and trade union rights across 
sectors within the region. All interviews were recorded and 
transcribed.
Data Analysis
The data analysis was conducted in two phases. This process 
allowed us to move back and forth between data and theo-
retical concepts (Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007).
Phase I: Identifying the Impediments to Workplace 
Unionism
We took an inductive approach to analyse the data through 
an open coding of all the information collected. This pro-
vided us with a first structure. To begin with, and as a way to 
become familiarised with the data, we listed all the reasons 
mentioned by survey participants explaining why workers 
did not belong to a trade union and did not engage in union 
activities. Thereafter, we identified the challenges mentioned 
by union representatives during the interviews. Finally, we 
coded the information retrieved from the focus groups and 
interviews with managers and representatives of the labour 
and social affairs department. From this analysis, 10 major 
impediments to workers’ representation and collective bar-
gaining emerged.
Phase II: Making Sense of the 10 Impediments
We conducted a cross-case analysis to identify similarities 
and differences in terms of experiencing the impediments 
across the studied farms. It became clear that the unions 
on the two farms were both in the early stages of mobilisa-
tion—in the sense that neither of them had yet succeeded 
in agreeing upon a collective bargaining agreement with 
management. The cross-case analysis also revealed that the 
union on the non-certified farm had more potential than the 
Table 3  Overview of workers’ 
characteristics
a Figures were calculated based on survey data
Certified farm
n = 70
Non-certified farm
n = 73
Female respondent (%) 67.1 67.1
Average day wage (Birr)a 21.75 (5.708) 24.54 (18.35)
Employment less than 6 months (%) 32.9 43.8
Employment less than 12 months (%) 47.1 56.2
Permanent contract (%) 81.2 66.2
Greenhouse (%) 31.4 64.4
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union on the certified farm. There were two striking differ-
ences between them, namely the union density and workers’ 
perceptions of the union. When we tried to explain these 
differences, we realised that the impediments on the non-
certified farm were not as constraining as they were on the 
certified farm.
To make sense of the impediments and understand the 
differences between the two farms, we turned to the existing 
literature and our integrated framework. First, we applied a 
vertical GVC lens to interpret our data. Applying this lens 
helped us to understand that the differences between the 
unions could be largely attributed to the presence of PSS on 
the certified farm. At the same time, this lens allowed us to 
understand the root causes of other obstacles mentioned by 
workers and union representatives.
Furthermore, we realised that overcoming these vertical 
forces would not necessarily result in functioning workplace 
unionism since these obstacles were also rooted in socio-
economic realities. Hence, we applied a horizontal lens to 
understand the forces in the socio-economic environment 
that also gave rise to impediments. Finally, we looked at the 
interactions between the vertical and horizontal lenses and 
created an integrated matrix of combined forces hampering 
unionism.
Results
This section discusses the 10 impediments revealed by the 
analysis of our two flower farms in Ethiopia. For this, we 
build on our integrated framework, which combines the ver-
tical and horizontal forces creating barriers to trade union-
ism. Although most of the impediments to trade union-
ism were common to the two cases, the analysis revealed 
some differences. Figure 1 provides an overview of the 
impediments to trade unionism in the cut flower industry 
in Ethiopia.
Lack of Awareness and Lack of Interest
On both farms, the workforce was highly unstable, leading 
to high levels of labour turnover. One of the reasons behind 
this phenomenon is the seasonal nature of flower demand 
(vertical force). Thus, peak demand is on Valentine’s Day 
and Mother’s Day, while most demand in Europe is low 
during the summer period (June–August) (Riisgaard 2011). 
Consequently, many workers were employed on a short-term 
basis and were given a seasonal or temporary contract (Bar-
rientos et al. 2003).
Moreover, flower farm workers on the two farms also left 
their jobs voluntarily (horizontal force). During the focus 
group sessions, workers made it clear that jobs on flower 
farms were regarded as a last resort. Wages were consid-
ered too low to make ends meet and rumours went around 
that female workers employed in greenhouses had trouble 
falling pregnant due to being exposed to pesticides. As a 
result, many workers aspired to a better job. Furthermore, 
62% of the 143 interviewed workers had less than one year 
of work experience on their farm. Workers explained that 
they kept juggling between different livelihood and income-
generating activities, including short-term assignments such 
as road construction, farming activities, or long-term jobs 
in the metal, plastic, and garment industries. Some female 
workers also left the country to work in the Middle East as 
maids.
Ironically, however, these individual ‘exit’ strategies, 
which were meant to improve the daily impoverished real-
ity of individual workers, subsequently hampered their abil-
ity to collectively improve working conditions on flower 
farms. Given that on both farms the majority of workers 
(62%) had less than one year of work experience, many of 
them (34.3%) were unaware of the existence of the trade 
union. Those workers who knew about the union were often 
uninterested in joining because they were not planning on 
staying in the job for long. On the certified farm, 43% of the 
Management decisions
- No common identity
- Isolation of workers
- Exclusive membership
- Time constraints - Membership fees
- Lack of support
- Lack of trust*
- Low bargaining power*
Seasonal demand/ demand fluctuations
Flexibility/ Just-in-
time orders
Private social 
standards
Gendered economiesHorizontal forces:
- Lack of awareness
- Lack of interest
Regulatory 
framework
Union traditionSpatial location of 
workers
Livelihood strategies
Vertical forces:
10 impediments 
to workplace 
unionism:
Downward pressure 
on prices
Fig. 1  Impediments to workplace unionism. *These impediments were found only on the certified farm, and were absent on the non-certified 
farm
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workers who did not want to join the union were planning to 
leave. Even more workers on the non-certified farm (83%) 
who were not a union member explained that they were not 
planning to stay in the job for long. Moreover, high labour 
turnover also affected the workers who were unionised and, 
even more problematically, those who were trade union rep-
resentatives. During the interviews, the union representative 
of the certified farm said that more than half of all represent-
atives elected the year before had already left the farm. In 
sum, our findings show that, as was also found by Carswell 
and De Neve (2013), workers’ focus on individual interests 
and individualised tactics restricted their ability to engage 
in collective action on both farms.
No Common Identity, Isolation of Workers, 
and Exclusive Membership
To be able to handle demand fluctuations (vertical force), 
and consequently the fluctuating nature of the workforce, 
managers used workforce segmentation based on the spa-
tial location of workers (horizontal force). Rural women, 
who were likely to leave their jobs to work on their own 
agricultural lands, were appointed to greenhouses. Urban 
women, who were generally the more stable workers, were 
assigned to work in the pack houses. The reason behind this 
segmentation was that work in the pack houses required 
some training, whereas work in the greenhouses could be 
reshuffled if workers suddenly left. The segmented nature 
of the workforce, however, had negative repercussions on 
workplace unionism in several ways.
Firstly, the difference in work units meant that there was 
a difference in working conditions. On the one hand, urban 
workers employed in pack houses worked overtime and thus 
earned a higher wage. They also worked in the shade and 
were not directly exposed to chemicals. Rural workers, on 
the other hand, were said to have more freedom to do their 
work since there was less supervision in greenhouses. How-
ever, due to the heat and exposure to pesticides, the work 
was perceived as more difficult and since there was no scope 
for overtime, remuneration was lower.
In addition, rural and urban workers did not have any 
contact. Outside the farm, they did not speak to one another. 
Rural workers walked to the flower farms while urban work-
ers were bussed in. Inside the farm, there was hardly any 
time to talk to workers of other work units since the only 
break (lunch) lasted no longer than half an hour and took 
place in separate shifts and in different places on the farm.
Management benefitted from the lack of awareness of 
workers about experiences in other work units. For example, 
during a focus group discussion, one worker narrated that 
on one occasion there was unrest in the greenhouse where 
she was working because workers had not received their full 
wage. As a way to express their disagreement, they stopped 
working. When the manager arrived, he claimed that they 
were the only greenhouse complaining. He told them that 
if they were unhappy they could just go (without getting 
their wages). The worker who narrated this event added that 
she did not know whether or not they were the only green-
house complaining. Yet, none of them had dared to face the 
manager and continue the ‘strike’ as they feared the conse-
quences it might have. She also said that this was the only 
time that they had stopped working.
Our survey data revealed that a large majority of union-
ised workers were urban workers. Only 4% of union mem-
bers were rural workers. When we asked them why they 
were not members, rural workers answered that they had 
not been invited to be part of the union (…it is exclusive; I 
wasn’t invited (as a rural worker)) and because they came 
from a rural area, they had no need to spend time with the 
union (“I come from the village and so I don’t need to spend 
time with them”).
Differences in working conditions between urban and 
rural workers and the lack of communication between work-
ers made it difficult to foster a sense of collective identity or 
to stand up for common concerns. As some scholars have 
pointed out, the ability to form a collective identity is a key 
ingredient for effective bargaining (Kelly and Kelly 1994; 
Kelly 1998; Wills 2005).
Time Constraints
The cut flower chain is characterised by organisational flex-
ibility in combination with just-in-time orders (vertical 
forces) and, in Ethiopia, by a gendered economy (horizontal 
force). Together, these forces created time constraints which 
had a direct impact on trade unionism.
Historically, trade union organisations have been male 
bastions. Women’s representation remains disproportion-
ately low—even in those unions where the majority of 
union members are women (Smith et al. 2004; Wills 2005). 
Throughout the focus group discussions, women argued that 
they did not have any time to engage in union activities. On 
average, a work week is 48 h spread over six consecutive 
days of eight hours, followed by one day off. Women com-
bined this work in the productive sphere with work in the 
domestic or reproductive sphere. On their day off, women 
went to the market and prepared food, did the laundry, and 
took care of children. Being actively involved in a trade 
union, for example as a representative, was described as time 
consuming and demanding, while the benefits for taking all 
these responsibilities were considered low. Thus, due to the 
dual role of women in Ethiopia, there was little spare time 
for them to actively engage in union activities and meetings. 
As further evidence, it became clear during the interviews 
with union representatives that more men than women were 
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representatives even though the majority of the workforce 
were women.
Membership Fees
Due to the downward pressures on prices (vertical force) 
and the absence of minimum wages within the regulatory 
framework (horizontal force), monthly wages on flower 
farms ranged between 550 and 600 birr/month (€23–25/
month). This amount corroborates the wages Women Work-
ing Worldwide found in their study across East Africa in 
2013 where it was concluded that flower farms in Ethiopia 
paid the lowest wages in the flower sector especially com-
pared to Kenya and Tanzania, and to some extent Uganda 
(Mlynska et al. 2015). The majority of the survey respond-
ents (88%) considered this wage too low to cover their basic 
needs. The membership fee for the union amounted to 1% of 
this monthly wage. On the certified farm in our case study, 
some workers stated they were not a member because they 
thought that it was too expensive to join the union, espe-
cially since they perceived very little or no benefits from 
being unionised. On the non-certified farm in our case study, 
however, workers did not complain about membership fees.
On the non-certified farm, membership fees were auto-
matically deducted from workers’ wages (through a check-
off system), which was not the case on the certified farm. 
According to the representative of the non-certified farm, 
membership fees were deposited in one bank account. All 
three auditors, working in different departments of the farm, 
had access to the account as a control mechanism to make 
sure that the money was not used inappropriately.
The money is automatically taken from the wage. The 
auditor will take it and put it in the bank. We have a 
bank account on the name of three auditors. To make 
sure that one person would not abuse it (union repre-
sentative, non-certified farm).
On the certified farm, however, union representatives had 
to collect the membership fees personally at the end of each 
month from each individual member. This appeared to be 
very difficult. Members argued every month, asking about 
what the union had achieved so far, or claiming that they did 
not have enough money to pay the fee. To attract new mem-
bers, the union on the certified farm was planning on lower-
ing the membership fee to less than 1% of their income (3 
birr instead of 5 birr), hoping they could retain the remaining 
members.
The way in which membership fees were collected played 
an important role, which needs to be understood in the con-
text of a lack of trust that is explained in the following sec-
tion. We noticed that on the certified farm, having to face 
workers each month and ask them for money allowed them 
to question the raison d’être of the trade union every time 
and, thereby, decide whether or not to pay the membership 
fee. On the non-certified farm, this decision had to be taken 
only once and therefore was less dependent on the concerns 
of the day.
Lack of External Support, Trust, and Bargaining 
Power
The presence of PSS (vertical force) and the low tradition 
of unionism in Ethiopia (horizontal force) gave rise to three 
impediments related to the support that trade unions may 
receive, the question of trust by the workers, and bargaining 
power.
Both unions were facing a lack of external guidance and 
support. Union representatives had well understood that 
the national federation (CETU) had limited power to actu-
ally make changes on the ground as none of the farms had 
reached a collective bargaining agreement. Therefore, they 
felt very much isolated, with no external support. As the 
representative from the certified farm put it:
Even last time, the president of the confederation 
came, but I don’t know if they don’t have time to fol-
low up... They didn’t change anything. Sometimes we 
don’t pay to the confederation monthly, and they didn’t 
even ask why we didn’t pay (union representative, cer-
tified farm).
Subsequently, meetings were rarely held at cluster or indus-
try level with representatives of other farms, which made 
it difficult for representatives to know what was going on 
in neighbouring farms. As a result, the unions operated in 
isolation from one another.
With regard to external support, union representatives 
explained that the government visited the flower farms annu-
ally, but that this was mainly a formality and did not have 
any impact:
They [the government] don’t care about the air pollu-
tion and soil pollution after the investor leaves. […] 
They [the government] have communication with the 
farm, so they’ll come just for the formality. They don’t 
check that much. So, coming once a year means letting 
people to suffer more, the whole year. (union repre-
sentative, non-certified farm).
We expected to find some differences between certified and 
non-certified farms with regard to external support. Com-
pared with unions on non-certified farms, unions on certified 
farms benefit from the advantage that they have established 
better links with campaigners in consumer markets. These 
campaigners can pressurise buyers to demand improvements 
in working conditions at the level of production (Riisgaard 
and Hammer 2011). However, the representative from the 
certified farm did not believe that PSS could help them 
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improve their bargaining rights. On the contrary, whereas 
auditors may see these union representatives as preferred 
local partners because they are key informants, the union 
representative in our case study had a very different under-
standing of the role played by these auditors and their influ-
ence on daily operations, or the support that could be pro-
vided by these auditors. The representative on the farm with 
certification schemes mentioned that she avoided telling 
the truth to the auditors of these schemes for three reasons. 
Firstly, she felt that the changes that these auditors would 
bring would only last for 1 day. Thus, these changes would 
not be long-lasting improvements. Secondly, she felt that 
auditors were mainly concerned with the safety of workers 
and the environmental impact of pesticides rather than the 
grievances workers had on the ground. Thirdly, she thought 
that if auditors knew the truth, they would want to shut down 
the farm. In other words, the union representative believed 
that a bad audit would harm the workers rather than help 
them:
[…] we don’t tell them about this, because we don’t 
want to get fired. […] but if they would truly know 
what ‘s going on in the flower farms, they might shut 
down the farm [….] I don’t want them to shut it down 
because there are a lot of workers who have nowhere 
to go (union representative, certified farm).
While the union representative of the certified farm did not 
trust auditors from the PSS, workers on this farm did not 
trust the union representatives. Indeed, several attempts had 
been made to establish a trade union on the certified farm. 
Each time, it was the manager who had asked the workers to 
take the initiative to organise themselves. According to the 
interviewed representative on this farm, it was known that 
management had a stake in having a union at the workplace. 
Indeed, the PSS that this farm has adopted expected manage-
ment to respect core ILO conventions, including promoting 
freedom of association and collective bargaining:
But around here, [the trade union] it is not functioning 
because we are under a lot of pressure. They [man-
agement] want the union only for certification. They 
don’t care about the rights of the workers. But they’re 
hurting their own citizens (union representative, certi-
fied farm).
However, such a top–down initiative was not supported by 
the workers. Each time initiatives for collective action were 
taken, the union failed or fell into inaction. Workers on the 
certified farm said that previous union representatives had 
not achieved anything. Moreover, they were accused of hav-
ing stolen membership fees and were perceived as being an 
extension of the manager’s power. The current union rep-
resentative was frustrated about the inability to change the 
union’s reputation, which had been damaged by previous 
representatives. Although at the time of data collection, new 
representatives had been elected which made it difficult to 
gain workers’ trust.
Contrastingly, on the non-certified farm, the union did 
not face any of the aforementioned trust-related problems. 
On this farm, representatives had been there from the very 
beginning and had been at the forefront of a conflict between 
management and workers. This continuity and positioning, 
together with the control mechanisms with regard to the fees, 
contributed to building up an image of experience and trust 
among workers.
A final impediment that we identified was a lack of bar-
gaining power. Union representatives mentioned in both 
cases that one of the major challenges they were facing was 
reaching a collective bargaining agreement with manage-
ment. On the certified farm, a collective bargaining agree-
ment was viewed as a means to make a difference and gain 
power. As long as an agreement had not been signed, they 
felt restricted in their actions and impacts. However, at the 
time of the data collection, the negotiation had not even 
begun:
Because you must have a ‘collective work agreement’ 
to say this is a problem or to say this is your fault to the 
management or to the workers. But still we don’t have 
the agreement. The worker might be fired if he did 
something, for example if he fights, and then they’ll 
come to us. Just because we don’t have the agreement, 
all we can do is begging the management. (union rep-
resentative, certified farm).
On the non-certified farm, management and the union had 
started negotiating the terms and conditions of a collective 
bargaining agreement. Workers knew about this process and 
believed in the importance of having such a collective agree-
ment. Nevertheless, it was a lengthy and difficult process 
as management did not fully agree with some of the condi-
tions that the union was suggesting. Nonetheless, there were 
positive signs showing that a collective agreement could be 
reached at some point.
Discussion
Building on our integrated framework, which combines a 
vertical and a horizontal lens, the study yields a number of 
new insights into the challenges faced by trade unions in 
developing countries when it comes to getting organised on 
the shop floor. The two lenses were key to understanding the 
unique setting in which flower farms operate in Ethiopia and 
thereby recognising impediments to workplace unionism.
In the rest of this section, we wish to go beyond the iden-
tification of the impediments. We consider the interaction 
between the impediments and, more particularly, to what we 
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call the ‘unionisation spiral’ that can weaken or strengthen 
trade unionism. We compare the two cases through the 
notion of ‘mobilisation process’ and propose ways to move 
forward and tackle the impediments.
The Unionisation Spiral
Although impediments were analysed separately in our 
“Results” section, it is important to consider the interplay 
between the impediments emerging from the vertical and 
horizontal forces. The interaction creates a certain dynamic 
that shapes and influences trade unionism.
The interplay affects three key dimensions with the first 
relating to awareness and interest. As shown in the first part 
of our results, this dimension is necessary although not 
sufficient for workers to engage with and in trade unions. 
Our case studies revealed the importance of time, energy, 
financial resources, and information availability to raise 
awareness and gain the attention of the workers. The second 
dimension relates to legitimacy that is the “perception or 
assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, 
or appropriate within some socially constructed system of 
norms, values, beliefs, and definition” (Suchman 1995, p. 
574). For unions to be active on the farm and function prop-
erly, they need to be regarded as legitimate actors especially 
by the workers. The lack of trust in trade unions, the low or 
non-existing perceived bargaining power of trade unions, 
and the lack of external support to the trade unions at the 
farms feed each other to create an anti-union environment. 
The third dimension is related to the capacity to act. If work-
ers and trade unions function in isolation from each other 
and if rural and urban workers do not mix (as it was the case 
in the studied farms), it becomes difficult for workers and 
unions to build a common identity and act collectively. The 
capacity to act can also be reinforced through a strong link 
with the regional or/and national union’s level, something 
that was missing in the cases investigated.
By acting on those three dimensions, awareness and inter-
est of workers, legitimacy of trade unions, and their capac-
ity to act, impediments can push the unionisation either up 
(strengthen unionisation) or down (weaken unionisation) the 
unionisation spiral. We argue that the downward spiral is 
both avoidable and reversible under many circumstances; but 
for that to happen, it is crucial to understand and act upon 
the interactions between impediments.
On the one hand, impediments can reinforce each other 
when each adds a layer making the hurdle higher. For exam-
ple, the very low wages offered by cut flower farms explain 
why workers perceive union membership as too expensive, 
and at the same time also explains why workers seek alter-
native livelihood strategies and have a short-term vision 
of their jobs. The combination of those two impediments 
reinforces the lack of interest in collective action. Another 
example is the flexibilization of the workforce, which goes 
hand in hand with its feminisation. Those who are hired for 
seasonal, insecure jobs are women, and due to their dual 
role as a worker and householder, which leads to time scar-
city, women find it more difficult to engage in trade union 
activities. These are clear impediments of which the inter-
play strengthens their impact on unionisation, which makes 
it even more difficult for trade unions to play an active role.
On the other hand, the impediments can neutralise or 
paralyse each other, thereby weakening negative impacts. 
For example, at the vertical level, buyers put pressure on 
producers into meeting high-quality standards at competi-
tive prices within specified delivery times. At the same 
time, these buyers ask producers to meet stringent social 
standards that demand good working conditions. These two 
impediments clearly contradict each other and thus could be 
used to neutralise each other. Another example concerns the 
interaction between two horizontal forces, namely the spatial 
location of workers and their livelihood strategies. These 
two forces constrain each other as rural workers cannot ben-
efit from better paid jobs in the city since they have limited 
transport options while urban workers cannot engage in their 
own agricultural activities due to a lack of access to land.
Considering the interactions between impediments may 
add a level of complexity, yet it offers a more comprehen-
sive understanding of the forces at play and provides some 
key points to avoid the downward spiral. Workers and trade 
unions can either endure the effects of the downward spiral 
or they can take a more agentic perspective, that is strategis-
ing and manipulating the impediments (Bandura 2001). The 
notion of agency refers to the ability of individuals to “act 
otherwise” (Giddens 1979). In other words, workers can be 
active agents with the ability to make things happen through 
their own actions rather than quietly accepting the impedi-
ments. It is related to the assumption that workers can be 
agents of power and change. Although external forces might 
constrain them, they have the capacity to make choices and 
act on those choices. The agency perspective has gained 
an abundance of popularity in the last decade especially 
around learning and development in work-related contexts 
(Eteläpelto et al. 2013; Goller and Paloniemi 2017) and is 
emerging in the global production networks literature (Cum-
bers et al. 2008; Riisgaard and Okinda 2018). The agentic 
approach offers a new way to explore the capacity of unions 
to improve the working conditions.
Differences Between Farms: Mobilisation Processes
Although both farms were located close to one another, and 
therefore exposed to the same horizontal forces, we found 
some differences between them. These differences could be 
largely attributed to one vertical force, that is the presence 
of private social standards (PSS). The role of PSS in relation 
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to trade union rights is peculiar. Given our context of low 
union tradition, managers on the certified farm had an incen-
tive to facilitate unionisation which, paradoxically, did more 
harm than good as it resulted in the distrust of the union by 
the workers.
Although the integrated framework—combining a verti-
cal (governance and structure of global value chains) and a 
horizontal (socio-economic context) lens—was very useful 
in identifying impediments to workplace unionism, the anal-
ysis of the two cases brought another dimension into play: 
the importance of mobilising workers to move from individ-
ual grievances to collective action. This implies understand-
ing forms of collectivism as much as the absence of col-
lectivism. We therefore turn to Kelly’s (1998) mobilisation 
theory to explain this specific aspect. For Kelly, injustice is 
the central organising principle for mobilising workers; it is 
the root of collective action (Kelly and Kelly 1994).
According to the theory of mobilisation, several stages 
are necessary before collective action can materialise (Kelly 
1998): (1) the development of a collective sense of injustice, 
that something is “wrong” or “illegitimate” (Kelly 1998, 
p. 27), (2) the identification of the employer as the cause 
of this injustice, (3) the recognition that collective action 
could rectify this injustice, and (4) leaders willing and able 
to mobilise. When comparing the two cases, we can see that 
the non-certified farm went through all four stages. As a 
result, collective action was possible, the union had a high 
membership rate, and was positively perceived by most of 
the workers. This was not the case on the certified farm.
On the non-certified farm, it all began with a strong sense 
of injustice:
They don’t get paid a good wage and they don’t have a 
good cafeteria. These are the reasons. And sometimes 
they would get fired without a reason, or they would 
reduce their wage without a reason. Because of these 
reasons, instead of fighting alone, they thought it was 
better to organise (union representative, non-certified 
farm).
Management on the non-certified farm was clearly viewed 
as the cause of workers’ grievances. According to the 
union representative we interviewed, a first attempt to 
unionise was so forcefully suppressed by management that 
it had the adverse effect of creating more worker support 
than before. Besides, the union on this farm was ambi-
tious. They were in the middle of negotiating a collective 
bargaining agreement. Moreover, they were already plan-
ning future collective action and agreements regarding the 
working conditions that they wanted to improve. These 
included 4 months of maternity leave instead of the current 
3 months, buying an ambulance or establishing a clinic on 
the company site so that sick workers no longer had to use 
their own transport by horse cart, and they were also going 
to bargain wage increments. In addition, they were making 
plans to collect money and purchase basic products such as 
sugar and oil from the government, which they could then 
sell at a cheaper price, and so forth. Finally, union repre-
sentatives on this farm had been there from the start of the 
union and had been at the forefront of the conflict between 
management and workers, making them experienced and 
trusted by workers. They had never breached this trust and 
had put control mechanisms in place to avoid misuse of 
membership fees.
On the certified farm, however, management interference 
appeared to impede all four stages of mobilisation. Conse-
quently, the trade union established on the certified farm 
was smaller in size and did not enjoy the support of as many 
workers as the trade union established on the non-certified 
farm. There was no sense of injustice at its core. Instead, 
the union had been established with a top-down approach as 
management had asked the workers to take the initiative to 
organise themselves. Moreover, management underestimated 
the negative consequences of initiating the unionisation and 
facilitating the election process. As a result, representatives 
felt deprived of their ability to raise problems that directly 
involved the management. By being so publicly in favour of 
having a union on the shop floor, management succeeded 
in creating the overall impression that they supported the 
trade union. However, according to the union representative, 
management strong-armed representatives by threatening to 
punish them at the time of wage evaluations. In other words, 
union representatives failed to differentiate themselves from 
management and did not manage to convince workers of the 
importance of concluding a collective bargaining agreement. 
Few workers on the certified farm believed that collective 
action could rectify injustice. In particular, because there 
had been more than one attempt to unionise, workers were 
not convinced that the union was going to be a motor of 
change or that it actually could make any changes on the 
ground. It simply was an empty box that did not have any 
power to change anything on the ground:
In the past, trade unions didn’t work. So, this one 
will stop also (answer to open survey question, 
worker from certified farm).
Finally, the union representative was less capable of mobi-
lising as evidenced by one representative who was frus-
trated because she was neither able to make any changes 
on the ground nor change the image that workers had of 
representatives as ‘puppets’ of management:
Even I am not happy to continue as a chairperson; I 
am considering to resign. Because sometimes when 
I read the rights of the workers and when I compare 
it to the facts on the farm, it is completely different 
(union representative, certified farm).
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Mobilisation theory helps us to conceptualise why the union 
on the non-certified farm showed more potential compared 
to the one on the certified farm.
Tackling Impediments
Identifying impediments to workplace unionism contributes 
towards a better understanding of why labour remains unor-
ganised at the bottom of global value chains, and ultimately 
helping those who wish to empower workers at the bottom 
of GVCs.
Our analysis shows that several impediments are rooted 
in socio-cultural norms and values. They are the outcomes 
of commercial dynamics inherent to vertical integration. 
Although eliminating these forces may be ambitious, we 
believe that there are ways to address them.
Making PSS on trade union rights more effective is a 
key aspect. However, answers are neither straightforward 
nor simple. As several authors have shown (Barrientos and 
Smith 2007; Egels-Zandén and Merk 2014; Wang 2005), 
there are many obstacles at different levels in the value chain 
that need to be addressed simultaneously before PSS can 
positively affect process rights. This study provides insights 
into the type of improvements that can be made, both at the 
vertical and the horizontal levels.
At the vertical level, our findings suggest a cautious and 
soft approach to PSS. Our study has shown that unionisa-
tion initiated by the management (such as in our certified 
farm) may hinder workers’ mobilisation and thereby lead 
to ineffective workplace unionism marked by limited bar-
gaining power and deficient worker trust. This is in line 
with the findings of previous studies that have criticised 
PSS for not correcting or remediating violations of trade 
union rights (Anner 2012). Therefore, we call for a careful 
implementation of standards to avoid the risk of becoming 
merely an incentive for the management to pressurise their 
employees and thereby hindering the improvement of work-
ing conditions.
This does not mean that PSS have no role to play in rela-
tion to trade union rights. An actor that emerged as poten-
tially key is the auditor. Although our study had limited data 
on auditors, it emerged as an area for further research. A key 
issue is to build a trusting relationship between auditors and 
union representatives for them to work as allies rather than 
enemies. Workers and union representatives have a misun-
derstanding and misconception of the role of the auditors. 
Auditing and standards organisations are changing their pro-
cesses to change the relationship. For example, the Ethical 
Trade Initiative is moving from a narrow top-down approach 
to a sophisticated approach that involves not just audits but 
also activities aimed at empowering workers (especially 
women), building workers’ understanding of their rights, 
and supporting suppliers to become better employers ((ETI 
2018; McAllister 2011). However, our cases revealed that 
on the field, trust remains problematic.
Moreover, there is a need for the certification bodies to 
move away from a tick-the-box approach or at least com-
plement it with an approach that allows room for repre-
sentatives to indicate actual worker concerns, regardless of 
standard criteria. Although the MPS-SQ standard foresees 
confidential talks with employees, the more critical voices 
seem not to be heard.
Finally, freedom of association violations and the mal-
functioning unions are rarely detected (Egels-Zandén and 
Lindholm 2015) or effectively tackled. We believe the 
impediments identified in this study could help auditors to 
detect them earlier and more easily. The impediments could 
be used for the interview with the union representatives to 
ask probing questions on items such as the level of (volun-
tary) labour turnover, the composition of union membership, 
the way union fees are collected, the personality of the union 
representatives, and the state of the relationship with man-
agement. Based on our findings, we argue that the identifica-
tion of impediments is the first step towards tackling them 
and making workplace unionism possible.
With regard to the horizontal dimension, our results sug-
gest that there may be room to strengthen unionisation at the 
cluster level. Currently, workers and representatives from 
different farms do not talk to each other. However, much can 
be learned from sharing experiences and comparing work-
ing conditions and union efforts. Both of the representatives 
we interviewed felt isolated and lacked support. They also 
expressed the need for external support. When exchanging 
experiences, representatives on non-certified farms may use 
the knowledge they have gained about better outcome stand-
ards on certified farms (e.g. work clothing, sanitary meas-
ures, paid leave) as leverage in their negotiations with their 
employers. In addition, representatives of certified farms 
may learn from union experiences on non-certified farms. 
Directing our attention to the Confederation of Ethiopian 
Trade Unions (CETU), we would therefore suggest that a 
platform where union representatives could meet be estab-
lished and/or strengthened.
Furthermore, trade unions should make a concerted effort 
to become more appealing to female workers. On the shop 
floor, women have different concerns to men. By way of 
illustration, women on flower farms are hired on an inse-
cure basis more often than men, (unannounced) overtime is 
more difficult for women to take on because they are also 
responsible for work in the reproductive sphere, pregnant 
women may be discriminated against, and female workers 
are more often the victim of sexual harassment by their male 
supervisors (Barrientos et al. 2003; Smith et al. 2004). As 
a result, it is essential for women’s voices to be represented 
in the trade union. This could be achieved by having prede-
termined seats for men and women in union representation, 
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in combination with capacity-building programmes (Smith 
et al. 2004). Such programmes should focus on instilling 
women with more confidence in their own abilities and on 
changing the self-image that Ethiopian women have of them-
selves, which is rooted in prevailing socio-cultural norms. 
As evidence of these historic notions, more than half of the 
female respondents in our survey were convinced that men 
were better supervisors or managers than women.
Conclusion
To date, at the bottom of global value chains, labour organi-
sation has remained at the fringes. While researchers who 
study this phenomenon tend to focus on different levels of 
analysis (i.e. GVC and local), there is a need for more inte-
grated frameworks that explore how the interaction and com-
petition between vertical and horizontal forces stifle work-
ers’ voices, such as the one outlined in this paper.
This study adds to the work on workplace unionism in 
agricultural value chains in several ways. Firstly, we showed 
that there were several impediments to workplace unionism. 
This brings to light the complexity of unionism at the bottom 
of the pyramid. While prior research has focused on study-
ing and explaining the limited impact of PSS on trade union 
rights, this study tackled a much broader research question 
and attempted to explain why workplace unionism in general 
had undergone limited development. We consider the iden-
tification of these impediments as a first and indispensable 
step towards the improvement of workers’ representation and 
collective bargaining ability.
Secondly, we developed a new way of identifying 
impediments to workplace unionism by developing an 
integrated framework of both horizontal and vertical 
forces. The interplay between these forces varies over time 
and place and could result in distinct outcomes in terms of 
workplace unionism. While past studies have researched 
each type of force separately, we argue that any initiative 
to tackle impediments to workplace unionism must pay 
attention to the interaction between these forces. Short-
term employment, for example, is caused by both verti-
cal and horizontal forces. On the one hand, the seasonal 
nature of flower production means that flower farms need 
to hire seasonal labour (vertical pressure), while on the 
other hand, individual workers apparently seek better job 
opportunities and flower farms face high levels of volun-
tary labour turnover (horizontal pressure). If one aims to 
tackle the impediments arising from these forces (workers’ 
‘lack of awareness’ and ‘lack of interest’), one needs to 
make sure that workers are employed on a long-term basis. 
It would however not be sufficient to change the produc-
tion pattern from one that targets peak demand to one that 
seeks a steady supply of flowers. Along with tackling this 
vertical pressure, one would need to tackle the horizontal 
pressure of workers seeking alternative livelihood strat-
egies by offering better working conditions and, subse-
quently, raising job satisfaction. Hence, we argue that the 
identification of the impediments is an important first step, 
but that we need to go beyond it and understand interac-
tions between vertical and horizontal forces if we wish to 
ascertain solutions rather than sustain the downward spiral 
towards failed unionism.
Thirdly, we broadened the research scope by including a 
non-certified farm in the study of workplace unionism. Past 
studies rarely compared the unionisation efforts of certified 
and non-certified farms. For our part, we showed how neces-
sary it is to compare these farms, given that our results sug-
gest that a union operating on a certified farm faces different, 
and somewhat more challenging impediments than a union 
on a non-certified farm. It is through such comparisons that 
one can truly explain the limited impact of PSS on trade 
union rights.
This study has a few limitations. First, we have studied 
two farms embedded in a specific institutional context and 
sector. This calls for some caution with regard to generalis-
ing the findings. Future research could broaden the scope 
of cases in terms of both unionisation maturity and type 
of farms. The unions studied in this paper were in an early 
stage of development and had not reached a collective bar-
gaining agreement at the time of research. Hence, it would 
be of interest to compare such farms with earlier stages of 
collective bargaining to those who are more advanced, and 
that have reached collective bargaining agreements. It may 
also be of interest to search for cases where the levels of 
regulatory support from national and sector unions would 
differ. This could provide further insight into how impedi-
ments may be altered through a learning effect or through 
external support. Further research could investigate more 
specifically how PSS impacts trade union rights in settings 
with a long union tradition. To question whether managers 
in such settings also interfere and facilitate unionisation on 
their farms seems relevant. This area would further increase 
our understanding of the conditions under which, perhaps, 
PSS could positively impact trade union rights.
Second, future research is necessary to continue the task 
of conceptual clarification of the impediments to work-
place unionism. This article advanced our understanding 
by identifying the horizontal and vertical forces that matter 
for workplace unionism. However, it remains unclear how 
and when these forces interact or contradict, reinforce or 
neutralise one another. This particular area clearly deserves 
further analysis and research. Future studies should aim to 
make it more explicit which combinations of impediments 
really make collective organising impossible. We also need 
to pursue studies that focus on understanding whether and 
how certain impediments could be overcome.
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Appendix: Overview of Working 
Conditions by MSP‑SQ Compared to ILO 
and the Ethiopian Labour Law
ILO Conv. Ethiopia 
Labour 
law
ETI MPS-SQ
Wage
 Wages shall, at the least, 
meet national legal 
or industry (CBA) 
minimum standards, 
whichever is higher, and 
always be sufficient to 
meet basic needs and to 
provide some discretion-
ary income
110 No Yes Yes
 Pay should be in cash Noa No Yes
 Information on wages shall 
be available to workers 
in an understandable and 
detailed form
No Yes Yes
 Deductions are not to be 
used as disciplinary 
measure
Nob Yes Yes
Contract
 All employees must be 
issued with a written 
employment contract 
which is legally binding
Yes Yes Yes
 A person may be employed 
for a probation period 
which shall not exceed 
45 consecutive days
Yes No No
 A contract of employment 
may be concluded for 
a definite period in the 
case of seasonal works
110, 170 Yes Yes Yes
Work hours and overtime
 Normal hours of work 
shall not exceed eight 
hours a day or 48 h a 
week
Yes Yes Yes
 Overtime shall be volun-
tary and not exceed 12 h 
per week; is compen-
sated at a premium rate
Yes Yes Yes
Paid leave
 Workers must have at least 
3 weeks of paid leave 
per year
Noc No Yes
Healthy work environment
 Companies shall comply 
with internationally rec-
ognised health and safety 
standards
170 No No Yes
ILO Conv. Ethiopia 
Labour 
law
ETI MPS-SQ
 There is a coherent policy 
for Occupational Safety, 
Health, and Working 
Environment
155 Yes No Yes
 There should be regular 
monitoring of workers’ 
health and safety
Yes No Yes
 All employees have access 
to drinking water, clean 
toilets, suitable rooms 
with eating, and storage 
facilities
No Yes Yes
Work clothing
 The company must supply 
its employees, free of 
charge, with suitable 
clean working clothes 
that, preferably, are to be 
washed by the company 
in order to avoid con-
tamination in the workers 
house
Yes No Yes
Child labour
 No workers under the 
age of 15 years shall be 
employed
182, 138 Nod Noe Yes
 Young persons under 18 
shall not be employed at 
night or under hazardous 
and unhealthy conditions
184 Yes Yes Yes
Trade union
 The rights of all workers 
to form and join trade 
unions and bargain 
collectively shall be 
recognised
87, 98 Yes Yes Yes
 Workers’ representatives 
shall not be subject 
of discrimination and 
shall have access to all 
workplaces necessary 
to enable them to carry 
out their representation 
functions
135 No Yes Yes
Women committee
 The farm should encour-
age the election and 
implementation of a 
Workers Committee for 
Women, whose role is 
defined by gender-related 
issues
No No Yes
Source Staelens (2016)
a Payment in kind is possible as long as it does not exceed 30% of 
wage paid in cash
b Except where it is provided otherwise by law or collective agreement 
or work rules or in accordance with a court order or a written agree-
 C. Louche et al.
1 3
ment of the worker. The amount in aggregate that may be deducted 
at any one time, from the worker’s wage shall in no case exceed one-
third of his monthly wages
c Workers must have at least 2 weeks of paid leave per year
d It is prohibited to employ persons under 14 years of age
e Follows the Ethiopian labour law
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